




# TrustForge: A Cryptographically Secure Enclave




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## TrustForge Enclave Advances Privacy Tech

- Enables zero-trust data sharing
  - No trust in any system security, software, programmers or IT staff
- Enables privacy-enhanced computation, without a valid data contract:
  - Unauthorized enclaves gen exception
  - Expired contracts gen exception
  - Unauthorized codes destroy data
  - Only authorized results are visible
- Provides hardware capabilities of homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge proofs
- Available on Amazon AWS and Microsoft Azure



# This 190k-gate functional unit implements always-encrypted computation, nullifying hacking and advancing privacy technology.




## A Recipe for Cryptographic TEEs...

- Eliminate **all** software vulnerabilities
  - But all software is (eventually) hackable!
  - Approach: **no S/W in the enclave**
- Silence side channels
  - Control, memory, timing, and uArch
  - Approach: **provably side-channel free enclave**
- Encrypt sensitive data everywhere else
  - Eliminates trust for all remaining S/W and H/W
  - Approach: **encrypt on exit of enclave**






## TrustForge: Inside the Zone of Trust

- TrustForge enclave **exports a public key**, PKI-encrypted keys are decrypted in enclave
- Enclave **supports RISC-like operations that operate directly on encrypted data**
- Enclave is decrypting, processing, checking, and re-encrypting secret data **without S/W vulnerabilities or digital side channels**
- Enclave is protected from physical attacks, and **data is encrypted everywhere else**



## TrustForge Enclave for Azure and AWS

- Deployed on FPGA nodes in the cloud
  - % of total UltraScale+ FPGA used: ~6%, ~190k gates
  - Logic locked, watermarked and with forward secrecy
  - 2-person years effort to build, fuzz test, and verify
- TrustForge competes with
  - Homomorphic encryption (HE and FHE)
  - Multiparty computation (MPC)
  - Bottom line: **Much faster than comparable frameworks, much more secure than TEEs**



## Use Case: Medical Data Sharing

- Privacy-preserving smartwatch-based heart monitoring
  - Data encryption:** biometric data is encrypted at the sensor, sent to server encrypted
  - Encrypted computation:** analysis of biometric data is performed on encrypted data, without giving access to the server or its operators
  - Guardrailing:** attackers cannot manipulate analysis algorithms to trigger false warnings
  - Safe datagrants:** arrhythmia analysis algorithm can expose potential health warnings to permit notification/text message to the user



Crypto-strength defenses: Not vulnerable to S/W hacking or digital side channels!

## Programming for the TrustForge Enclave

- TrustForge extends development language with encrypted variables
- Bit-for-bit compatible**, but encrypted
- Support for **integers, floating-point, Booleans, and strings**
- Encrypted **ops return encrypted results**
- Decision processing on encrypted variables implemented with **CMOV primitive**
- Secret-dependent array indexing implemented with **ORAM primitives**


Type Class	C++ Data Types
Integer	enc_int, enc_uint, enc_long, enc_ulong
Floating Point	enc_float, enc_double
Boolean	enc_bool
String/Char	enc_char, enc_char, enc_string

```
1 x = enc_cmov( secret, x+1, x );
2 y = enc_cmov( !secret, y+1, y );
```

```
1 for(int i=0; i<len(arr); i++)
2   ret = enc_cmov(i==secret, arr[i], ret);
```

## TrustForge Security Analysis

- Worked with In-Q-Tel & Blue Bastion, pen tested for 3 months
  - Red team had full access to all IP
  - Zero vulnerabilities found**
- Formal verification with Princeton
  - Secure for **any program** on a **specific implementation**
  - Zero vulnerabilities found**
  - Proofs to appear in ACM CCS 2023



Security Verification of Low-Trust Architectures

ABSTRACT Low trust architectures work on the premise of software, always receiving data and significantly reduce the amount of hardware that a small software free enclave component. In this paper, we perform a complete formal verification of a specific low trust architecture: the Segmented Execution (SE) architecture, to show that the design meets the security requirements of a low trust architecture and digital side channels for all possible programs. We first define the security requirements of the SE architecture and then use the SE architecture to show how our program enforces these requirements. This SE architecture is a specification for the hardware, and is used to define the proof obligations for any RTL implementation arising from the SE architecture. This work covers both functional and digital side-channel leakage. Next, we show how the SE architecture can be used to implement a...